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The Trade Credit Channel and Monetary Policy Transmission:  
Empirical Evidence from U.S. Panel Data 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate whether a trade credit channel mitigates monetary policy tightenings intended to 
slow economic activity.  Unlike prior research, we study this issue using quarterly firm-level data 
for nearly the universe of non-financial public corporations and using more precise measures of 
their credit market access.  We estimate firm-level models of the supply and demand for trade 
credit from 1988 to 2008.  Our evidence suggests that policy tightenings evoke a flow of trade 
credit from public firms commensurate with their credit market access which goes primarily to 
private firms, a previously undocumented finding. 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
This paper reexamines the role of trade credit in the transmission mechanism of US 
monetary policy.  In the traditional Keynesian view monetary policy impulses affect aggregate 
demand by influencing interest rates and investment (the interest rate channel).  Empirical 
evidence that business investment is fairly insensitive to interest rates has led researchers to 
propose alternative transmission mechanisms, among them the credit channel based on frictions 
in credit markets (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Along one avenue in this channel, the bank 
lending channel, monetary policy is thought to affect aggregate demand by shifting the supply of 
bank loans, influencing the ease with which firms finance normal operations. Meltzer (1960) 
notes that a trade credit channel may work against this bank lending channel.  He finds evidence 
that cash-rich firms increase trade credit to cash-poor firms in tight-money periods, filling the 
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void left by reduced bank lending.  Since Meltzer (1960), the trade credit channel has received 
comparatively little attention (Mateut, 2005) and its existence in the US remains controversial.1 
Neither Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) nor Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) find evidence that trade 
credit expands during tight-money periods while Nilsen (2002) and Choi and Kim (2005) do.2  
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) and Yang (2011) examine the supply and 
demand for trade credit around the 2008 financial crisis but their studies are focused too 
narrowly to provide general conclusions.   
We revisit the question of a trade credit channel in the US using an innovative empirical 
approach.  Specifically, we estimate models of the supply and demand for trade credit on 
quarterly firm-level data for essentially the universe of non-financial Compustat firms from 1988 
through 2008. 3  In addition to including controls for the stance of monetary policy and firm-
specific factors, our models include controls which better distinguish firms with good credit 
                                           
1 Brechling and Lipsey (1963) provide a theoretical basis for Meltzer’s empirical results and note the potential for 
trade credit to contravene monetary policy.  Other theoretical arguments consistent with a trade credit channel 
appear in Schwartz (1974), Biais and Gollier (1997), Wilner (2000),  Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) and Mateut et al. 
(2006).  Empirical evidence from the UK consistently supports the existence of a trade credit channel, including 
Atanasova and Wilson (2003), Mateut et al. (2006) and Guariglia and Mateut (2006). Elsewhere the empirical 
evidence is mixed: whereas Fishman and Love (2003) and Love et al. (2007) find evidence of a trade credit channel 
in multi-country studies, Marotta (1997) and De Blasio (2005) find little evidence of a trade credit channel in Italy 
and Cook (1999) finds no evidence in Russia. 
2 Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) study the time series behavior of aggregate accounts 
receivable and payable for manufacturing firms in the Quarterly Financial Reports from the mid 1970s through 
1991. We describe the work of Nilsen (2002) and Choi and Kim (2005) more fully below.     
3 We end our sample period after 2008 to prevent distortions attributable to the financial crisis. The empirical results 
we report are qualitatively unchanged if we drop the last two quarters of 2008. 
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market access able to supply trade credit from firms with poor credit market access having need 
of trade credit. 
To preview our results, we find evidence consistent with a trade credit channel involving 
both public and private firms.  Specifically, we find that in tight-money periods public firms with 
good credit market access expand their accounts receivable (i.e., supply trade credit) 
commensurate with their credit market access as envisioned by Meltzer (1960). We also find that 
tight money leads public firms to expand their accounts payable (i.e., demand for trade credit) 
negligibly irrespective of their credit market access. These findings are both novel to the 
literature and surprising because they imply that some demand for trade credit is missing because 
one firm’s receivables are another firm’s payables.  Since our sample covers nearly the universe 
of public corporations, we conclude that the missing trade credit demand comes from private 
firms not in our sample but which have poor credit market access, a conclusion for which we 
find support in the literature.   
Our results are significant for at least two reasons.  First, they suggest that a greater 
tightening of monetary policy is needed to achieve a desired degree of restraint than in the 
absence of the trade credit channel.  Second, they suggest that the effects of tighter monetary 
policy fall unevenly on public and private firms. 
Our paper relates directly to work by Nilsen (2002) and Choi and Kim (2005), whose 
evidence on the trade credit channel complements and contrasts with ours.  Nilsen uses VAR 
models to study how a reduction in bank lending leading to higher interest rates affects 
manufacturing firms’ demand for trade credit, measured as accounts payable relative to sales.4 
                                           
4 He uses aggregate data on manufacturing firms from the Quarterly Financial Reports (QFR) and annual firm-level 
data on 238 manufacturing firms from Compustat between 1975 and 1999.   
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Consistent with a trade credit channel, Nilsen finds that small public and private firms increase 
their payables in tight-money periods, as expected from firms with few financing alternatives.  
Additionally, he finds that large public firms without bond ratings increase their payables when 
money is tight whereas firms with bond ratings do not.  
Choi and Kim (2005) consider how tighter monetary policy affects supply and demand for 
trade credit at S&P 500 firms and a sample of non-S&P 500 firms.  They estimate firm-level 
supply and demand models on quarterly Compustat data.5  Consistent with a trade credit channel, 
Choi and Kim find that tight money leads firms of both types to expand their supply of trade 
credit but that non-S&P 500 firms expand supply significantly more. This result differs from the 
Meltzer (1960) conception of the channel since non-S&P 500 firms have generally poorer credit 
market access than S&P 500 firms.  Also at odds with Meltzer is their finding that tight money 
leads both firm types to expand their demand for trade credit by the same amount, rather than to 
a greater expansion at non-S&P 500 firms.  Choi and Kim conclude that a trade credit channel 
exists but that the flow of trade credit is not unidirectional from firms with better credit market 
access to firms with poorer access.    
Our paper also relates to work by Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) and 
Yang (2011), who examine supply and demand for trade credit around the 2008 financial crisis.  
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) investigate supplier-client pairs using quarterly 
                                                                                                                                        
 
5 They measure trade credit demand and supply as payables-to-assets and receivables-to-assets, respectively, over a 
1974-1997 sample period. 
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Compustat data.6  They find that the crisis reduced the overall supply of trade credit but 
expanded the supply from suppliers with greater liquidity.  They also find that the crisis 
generally increased the demand for trade credit especially at firms with poor credit market access 
as judged by several metrics including the Whited and Wu (2006) index.  Yang (2011) studies 
supply and demand for trade credit at manufacturing firms using quarterly Compustat data 
between 2005 and 2009.  He finds that once the crisis broke all firms expanded their supply and 
demand for trade credit. 
Our paper complements work by Demiroglu et al. (2012), who study how changes in bank 
lending standards following monetary policy changes affect bank credit lines. Their sample 
comprises 2,141 private firms and a like number of public firms with similar attributes observed 
from 1993 to 2003. The sample firms are quite small, having median total assets of around $22m 
in year 2000 prices.  Demiroglu et al. find that tighter lending standards affect public and private 
firms having established credit lines similarly however private firms lacking lines get 
significantly fewer new lines and increase accounts payable significantly more than public firms 
lacking credit lines.  
Our paper advances the literature on trade credit and the transmission of US monetary 
policy in two ways. The first is through our empirical strategy: we test for the existence of a 
trade credit channel using firm-level quarterly data on essentially the universe of publicly-traded 
non-financial corporations. Use of firm-level data allows us to estimate firm-level models of 
trade credit supply and demand which control for other motives for using trade credit beyond the 
                                           
6 Their sample represents less than a quarter of firms with quarterly Compustat data. They measure the supply of 
trade credit as accounts receivable over sales and the demand for trade credit as accounts payable over cost-of-goods 
sold. 
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purely financial motive.7  Use of quarterly data allows us to measure more precisely the link 
between change in monetary policy and change in the supply and demand for trade credit.  Use 
of virtually all public non-financial firms yields a more comprehensive view of the total effect of 
monetary policy on trade credit flows.8   
Our second contribution is our novel means of representing the credit market access of our 
sample firms, a key issue since the existence of a trade credit channel presupposes unequal 
access.  We use two credit market access measures: the Z-Score index of Altman (1968) as 
modified by MacKie-Mason (1990) and the Whited and Wu (1996) index. Z-Score, which 
gauges the probability of bankruptcy in the coming 24 months, enjoys widespread use.9  Molina 
and Preve (2009, 2012) show that financial distress changes firms’ supply and demand for trade 
credit while decreasing firms’ access to bank credit.10  The Whited and Wu (2006) index 
measures difficulty in financing investment. Researchers use it to gauge constraints on firms’ 
                                           
7  See Mateut (2005) for a more detailed review of theories of trade credit. 
8 Our empirical approach stands in contrast to prior approaches. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996) use aggregate quarterly data on manufacturing firms. Nilsen (2002) uses both aggregate quarterly 
data and firm-level annual data on manufacturing firms. Choi and Kim (2005) use firm-level quarterly data on 
subsets of large and small firms from the Compustat universe.  Demiroglu et al. (2012) use firm-level annual data on 
samples of private and public firms. Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) and Yang (2011) use firm-
level quarterly data on samples of manufacturing firms. 
9  As one illustration, Aktas et al. (2012) note that financial institutions use Z-score to judge firms’ financial health 
in making lending decisions, supporting our use of Z-score as a measure of credit market access.  
10 Molina and Preve (2009, 2012) study trade credit at financially distressed firms from 1978-2000 using annual 
Compustat data.  Increasing financial distress reduces firms’ supply of trade credit (Molina and Preve, 2009) and 
increases their demand (Molina and Preve, 2012). 
7 
 
financial market access (e.g., Livdan et al., 2009).11  We use Z-Score and WW-Score both as 
independent variables in our trade credit supply and demand models and as a means of 
stratifying our sample to produce subsamples of firms having similar credit market access. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our estimation strategy. 
Section III presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section IV reports and discusses our 
empirical results. Section V concludes the paper.  
 
II. Test Strategy 
If a trade credit channel exists, a monetary policy tightening should expand both the supply 
of trade credit from financially strong firms with good credit market access and the demand for 
trade credit by financially weak firms with poor credit market access. We test this conjecture. 
The conjecture implies the components of a test strategy: firm-level data spanning a time 
interval over which the stance of monetary policy changes; a measure of policy stance; measures 
of firms’ credit market access; and econometric models of the supply and demand for trade 
credit.  We employ these components as follows.  We start with quarterly firm-level data over an 
extended time interval and define a zero-one indicator variable to identify tight money periods, 
D_TMP.  We define two measures of a firm’s credit market access, CMA1 and CMA2, and 
compute these measures for every firm each quarter.  We sort the firms by CMA1 each quarter 
                                           
11 Most prior research on the trade credit channel uses firm size to measure credit market access (e.g., Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1993; Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996; and Choi and Kim, 2005). Nilsen uses firm size, public or private 
status and presence of a bond rating.  Demiroglu et al. (2012) uses public or private status. Yang (2011) uses 
presence of a bond rating.  Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) use presence of a bond rating along 
with six other measures, among them WW-score.  
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and define a set of indicators for the CMA1 quartile, D_CMA1n, n=1,2,3,4, 4 indicating the 
poorest access.  We repeat the process using CMA2.  We then use CMA1 to stratify the whole 
sample into subsamples with different degrees of credit market access and use CMA2 to identify 
firms having different degrees of credit market access within these subsamples.  Specifically, we 
designate the panels for which D_CMA11 =1 and D_CMA14 =1 as the unconstrained and 
constrained panels, respectively.  Within each panel we again sort firms by CMA2 each quarter 
and define the quartile indicators D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3,4, 4 indicating the poorest access. Finally 
we estimate reduced-form models of trade credit supply and trade credit demand, represented by 
the ratio of a firm’s accounts receivable to assets, AR/A, and accounts payable to assets, AP/A, 
on data for the whole sample and for the unconstrained and constrained panels.  
(1)       �ARA �it =  αs  +  �βns  D_CMA2n,i,t−13
n=1
 + φs D_TMPt−1  + �γns  D_CMA2n,i,t−13
n=1
∗ D_TMPt−1   
+ �δks   Xk,i,t−1 K
k
 + �θns3
n=1
D_Qn   +  µis  +  εits        
 
(2)      �APA �it = αd  + �  βnd D_CMA2n,i,t−13
n=1
+ φdD_TMPt−1 + �γnd D_CMA2n,i,t−13
n=1
∗ D_TMPt−1            
+   �δjd Wj,i,t−1J
j
  +   �θnd3
n=1
  D_Qn   +   µid  +   εitd             
Subscripts i and t denote firm i and quarter t. Superscripts s and d denote parameters in the trade 
credit supply and demand equations, respectively. Xk,i,t-1, k = 1,.., K and Wj,i,t-1, j = 1,..,J are firm-
specific determinants of firm i’s trade credit supply and demand, respectively.  We observe these 
determinants one quarter earlier than the dependent variable, at time t-1, to avoid endogeneity 
bias.  D_Qn, n = 1,2,3,4, are binary indicators of calendar quarters to control for seasonality 
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effects; D_Q4 is the omitted quarter. Similarly D_CMA24, the indicator for CMA2 quartile 4, 
having the poorest credit market access, is the omitted category.  µis and µid are unobservable, 
time-invariant fixed firm effects in the supply and demand equations, respectively.    εis  and εid  are error terms assumed to have all desirable properties. 
Initial evidence on the trade credit channel comes from the estimated coefficients of the 
credit market access variables D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3, namely βns  and βnd, n=1,2,3.  If a channel 
exists, supplier firms with good credit market access offer trade credit to support purchases by 
buyer firms with poorer access.  Offers of trade credit should decline as supplier firms’ credit 
market access declines while demand for trade credit should rise as buyer firms’ credit market 
access declines. Estimates of (1), the trade credit supply equation, will support the existence of a 
trade credit channel if the estimated coefficients of D_CMA2n decline in n, i.e., β1s  > β2s  > β3s> 0, 
and are larger in the unconstrained panel.  Estimates of (2), the trade credit demand equation, 
will support the existence of a trade credit channel if the estimated coefficients rise in n, i.e., β1d 
< β2d < β3d < 0, and have larger absolute values in the constrained panel.
12 
Further evidence on the trade credit channel comes from the estimated coefficients of the 
tight monetary policy indicator D_TMPt-1, φs and  φd.  If a channel exists tighter policy expands 
the supply of trade credit, especially at firms with the best credit market access, and expands the 
demand for trade credit particularly at firms with the poorest credit market access. Thus when we 
estimate (1) and (2) on separate panels of unconstrained and constrained firms, the estimated φs 
                                           
12 Our choice of D_CMA24 as the omitted category affects the interpretation of βns  and βnd, n=1,2,3.  βns  (βnd) is the 
effect on a firm’s trade credit supply (demand) of being in credit market access category n, n=1,2,3, relative to being 
in category 4. Firms in category 4 should supply the least trade credit (hence we expect βns > 0) and demand the 
most trade credit (hence we expect βnd < 0). 
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should be larger in the former panel and the estimated φd should be larger in the latter.  When 
we estimate (1) and (2) on data for the whole sample the estimates of φs and  φd  should be 
positive.13   
Final evidence on the trade credit channel comes from the estimated coefficients of the tight 
money/credit market access interaction terms D_CMA2n,i,t−1 ∗ D_TMPt−1, n = 1,2,3, namely γns  
and γnd, n=1,2,3. If a trade credit channel exists, tighter policy expands the supply and demand 
for trade credit with supply increasing in firms’ credit market access and demand decreasing in 
firms’ credit market access. Estimates of (1) will support the existence of a channel if γ1s > γ2s >
γ3
s> 0 and if the γns s are larger in the unconstrained panel. Estimates of (2) will support the 
channel and if γ1d < γ2d < γ3d < 0 and if the γnds  have larger absolute values in the constrained 
panel.14  
 
 
 
                                           
13 In our modeling, φs and φd measure both the effect of tight money on supply and demand for trade credit 
common to all firms and the effect of tight policy on firms in the omitted credit market access category, D_CMA24 
=1. In general, φs and φd could be negative if tight policy dampens economic activity. Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga (2013) find that the overall supply of trade credit fell at the onset of the financial crisis, implying 
φs< 0 for their sample. 
14 Our modeling approach imparts the following interpretations on the coefficients.  βns  (βnd) shows the effect on 
trade credit supplied (demanded) of a firm being in credit market access quartile 1, 2, or 3 relative to quartile 4 in a 
loose-money period (i.e. D_TMP-1=0);  φs ( φd) shows the common effect on trade credit supplied (demanded) of a 
tight-money period; and βns + γns  ( βnd+ γnd) shows the effect on trade credit supplied (demanded) of a firm being in 
credit market access quartile 1, 2, or 3 relative to quartile 4 in a tight-money period. 
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III. Data 
A. Sample Design and Description of Variables 
We start with the universe of firms in the quarterly Compustat database from 1988 through 
2008.15  We exclude financial service firms (SIC Code 60-69), utility firms (SIC Code 49), and 
non-classified firms (SIC Code 99). We also omit firms with negative or zero assets and 
quarterly sales of less than $5 million. The panel is unbalanced which allows for entry and exit, 
partially mitigating concerns about sample selection and survival bias.  The whole sample 
comprises 303,633 firm quarters. 
Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992) we use the effective federal funds rate to distinguish 
quarters of tight and loose monetary policy.  Specifically, we define a tight-money quarter as one 
with an end-of-quarter effective fed funds rate of 5% or more.  We define a tight monetary policy 
indicator, D_TMP, to be one in tight-money quarters and zero otherwise.  By this definition 42 
of the 84 quarters from 1988 to 2008 are tight-money quarters. 
We use the Whited and Wu (2006) index as our first credit market access measure, CMA1.  
WW-score measures a firm's difficulty in financing investment, with larger values indicating 
greater difficulty and, hence, poorer credit market access.  Table 1 reports the definition of WW-
score. We sort our sample firms by CMA1 each quarter and identify the least and most 
constrained quartiles, which we call the unconstrained and constrained panels, respectively.16  
We permit firms to move in and out of these panels over time as their financial performances 
                                           
15 We start our sample period in 1988 because this is the first year quarterly Compustat data are complete for most 
firms. We include both active and inactive firms. 
16 For all firms in the unconstrained (constrained) panel D_CMA11 =1 (D_CMA14 =1). 
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warrant.  Our unconstrained (constrained) panels comprise 68,482 firm-quarters (70,989 firm-
quarters).   
 
**** Table 1 about here **** 
 
We use Altman's (1968) Z-score as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990) as our second credit 
market access measure, CMA2.  Z-score indexes the likelihood that a firm declares bankruptcy 
in the coming 24 months, with larger values implying more probable bankruptcy and, hence, 
poorer credit market access.17 Table 1 reports the definition of Z-score. We sort our whole 
sample and our unconstrained and constrained panels by Z-score each quarter and define Z-score 
quartile indicators, D_CMA2n , n = 1,2,3,4.  We allow firms to migrate across quartiles as their 
financial conditions dictate. D_CMA21 =1 (D_CMA24 =1) indicates a firm in the best (poorest) 
credit market access quartile  
We represent firm-specific determinants of trade credit supply using eight variables, the Xks 
in (1): LnA-1, LnAge-1, Tobin’s Q-1, Sales/A-1, CS/A-1, and AP/A-1, D_TMP*Sales/A-1 and 
D_TMP*CS/A-1.  Assets (LnA-1) and firm age (LnAge-1) characterize a firm’s reputation. Firms 
with established reputations need not extend trade credit to attract sales unlike relatively 
unknown firms (Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Long et al, 1993; Murfin and Njoroge, 2015), hence 
we expect negatively signed coefficients on LnA-1 and LnAge-1. Tobin’s Q-1 represents growth 
opportunities (Deloof and Jegers, 1999). Firms with greater opportunities may try to raise the 
cash to exploit them by selling their products on credit, leading to a positive coefficient on 
                                           
17 We reverse the algebraic sign of Z-score so that higher values imply more probable bankruptcy and, hence, poorer 
credit market access, similar to WW-score. 
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Tobin’s Q-1.  Accounts receivable will be tied to prior-quarter sales when firms routinely extend 
some trade credit to facilitate transactions and when quarterly sales show positive time trends, 
producing a positive coefficient on Sales/A-1.  Production lead times create correlations between 
current-quarter accounts receivable and prior-quarter balance sheet accounts. Specifically, firms 
with greater accounts receivable will have previously reduced cash and increased accounts 
payable to buy inputs to production, producing a negative coefficient on CS/A-1 and a positive 
coefficient on AP/A-1.  We include interactions between the monetary policy variable D_TMP-1 
and the control variables Sales/A-1 and CS/A-1 to permit them to exert a different effect on 
accounts receivable in tight money periods.  
We represent firm-specific determinants of trade credit demand using twelve variables, the Wjs in (2): LnA-1, LnAge-1, Tobin’s Q-1, Sales/A-1, CS/A-1, INV/A-1, AR/A-1, CF/A-1, LTD/A-1, 
D_TMP*Sales/A-1, DTMP*CS/A-1, and D_TMP*CF/A-1.  Assets and firm age again characterize 
a firm’s reputation. Firms with established reputations demand less trade credit as they have 
access to better funding sources, producing negative coefficients on LnA-1 and LnAge-1.  Tobin’s 
Q-1 again represents growth opportunities.  Firms with more opportunities are more likely cash 
constrained and thus in more need of trade credit, suggesting a positive coefficient for Tobin’s Q-
1.  Positive correlation between current and prior-quarter sales should lead greater prior-quarter 
sales to raise current-quarter demand for trade credit to finance purchases of product inputs, 
implying a positive coefficient on Sales/A-1. For firms which match the maturities of short-term 
assets and liabilities, higher levels of prior-quarter cash (CS/A-1), inventories (INV/A-1), and 
accounts receivable (AR/A-1) should produce greater demand for trade credit, leading to positive 
coefficients on CS/A-1, INV/A-1, and AR/A-1.  Greater cash flow relative to assets (CF/A-1), 
defined as net income plus depreciation divided by assets, facilitates purchases of product inputs 
14 
 
and reduces firms’ need for trade credit, leading us to expect a negatively signed coefficient on 
CF/A-1.  Better access to long-term credit, evidenced by a larger long-term-debt-to-asset ratio 
(LTD/A-1), reduces the need for trade credit, producing a negative coefficient on LTD/A-1. 
Interactions between the monetary policy variable D_TMP-1 and the controls Sales/A-1, CS/A-1, 
and CF/A-1, allow these controls to impact accounts payable differently when money is tight.   
 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for the unconstrained and 
constrained panels.  Unconstrained firms are significantly larger, faster growing and more 
established, on average, than constrained firms. In the whole sample mean book-value assets and 
sales are $2.7b and $0.6b, respectively, in 2008 dollars; in the unconstrained and constrained 
panels mean assets and sales are, respectively,  more than double the whole sample means and 
less than half the whole sample means.  In the whole sample annual sales growth (SG) averaged 
nearly 2% over the 21-year sample period; in the unconstrained and constrained panels annual 
sales growth averaged 4.6% and -0.1%, respectively. In the whole sample mean firm age is 11.4 
years; in the unconstrained and constrained panels mean age is 13.3 years and 11 years, 
respectively. 
 
**** Table 2 about here **** 
 
Descriptive statistics for CMA1 and CMA2 (WW-score and Z-score, respectively) confirm 
that firms in the unconstrained panel have significantly better credit market access than firms in 
the constrained panel. In the unconstrained panel mean CMA1 is -0.83 with a standard deviation 
of 0.28; the same statistics for the constrained panel are -0.26 and 0.31, respectively.  Similarly, 
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mean CMA2 is -0.71 with a standard deviation of 0.98 in the unconstrained panel, and -0.31 and 
1.64, respectively, in the constrained panel. 
Mean AR/A and AP/A are significantly different in the whole sample (0.18 and 0.10, 
respectively), a counter-intuitive result since it implies that the sample firms extended more trade 
credit than they received, a clear violation of accounting identities since extending trade credit 
creates an account receivable for the creditor firm and an identical-size account payable for the 
debtor firm.  We contend that the wedge between mean AR/A and mean AP/A mainly reflects 
the omission of private firms from the Compustat universe. Specifically, private firms have 
limited sources of funds, making them more likely than public firms to demand trade credit and 
less likely to supply it.  Consequently the whole-sample mean AR/A represents trade credit 
supplied by the average public firm to both public and private firms whereas the whole-sample 
mean AP/A represents trade credit demanded by the average public firm primarily from other 
(mainly public) firms. 
Mean AR/As are also significantly different in the constrained and unconstrained panels 
(0.20 and 0.16, respectively), also a counter-intuitive result as it suggests that constrained firms 
supply more trade credit. We maintain that this difference is due in part to differences in the 
composition of assets at constrained and unconstrained firms.  In particular, unconstrained firms 
can use their superior credit market access to obtain more readily long-term loans with which to 
buy such long-term assets as plant and equipment or to engage in mergers and acquisitions.  Two 
pieces of evidence from Table 2 support this reasoning.  First, the mean long-term debt-to-asset 
ratio (LTD/A-1) is significantly larger in the unconstrained panel (23% vs. 19%).  Second, the 
mean cash-to-asset ratio (CS/A-1) and mean inventory-to-asset ratio (INV/A-1) are smaller in the 
unconstrained panel (11% and 16% vs. 15% and 19%). 
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**** Table 3 about here **** 
 
Table 3 shows the effect of credit market access on AR/A and AP/A.  The first column 
shows CMA1 deciles arranged in order of increasing difficulty of financing investment and 
accessing credit markets; the second column shows mean CMA1 in each decile. Mean and 
median AR/A rise with declining credit market access, reflecting in part the difficulty financially 
constrained firms face in accessing credit markets to finance long-term assets. Mean and median 
AP/A also rise with declining credit market access as expected when poorer credit market access 
forces greater reliance on trade credit, although the rise is much less pronounced than the rise in 
mean and median AR/A.  
 
**** Table 4 about here **** 
 
Table 4 reports mean AR/A, AP/A, CMA1 and CMA2 by year for the whole sample and for 
the unconstrained and constrained panels. Mean AR/A declines over the sample period in all 
three samples. Mean AP/A declines in the whole and the constrained samples but shows little 
movement in the unconstrained sample. In every year mean AR/A for the constrained panel 
equals or exceeds mean AR/A for the unconstrained panel. An analogous statement applies to 
AP/A, except in 2008. Mean CMA1 fluctuates over the sample period, reflecting changes in the 
difficulty of financing investment and accessing capital credit market over the business cycle.   
In the whole sample mean CMA1 falls to -0.70 in 1991 and to -0.72 in 2001 near the cyclical 
peaks in July 1990 and in March 2001. Mean CMA2 rises over the sample period in all three 
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samples, implying a general rise in financial distress and a general decline in credit market 
access. Mean CMA2 is consistently lower in the unconstrained sample than the constrained 
sample, however. 
 
**** Table 5 about here **** 
 
Table 5 presents statistics on CMA1, AR/A, and AP/A stratified by the stance of monetary 
policy.    Panel A shows for the whole sample that the average firm is significantly more 
constrained when policy is tight: mean CMA1 in loose- and tight-money periods are -0.57 and 
-0.53, respectively.  Panel B shows that firms use significantly more trade credit when policy is 
tight: in tight-money periods mean AR/A and mean AP/A are larger in the whole sample and in 
the unconstrained and constrained panels.  
 
IV. Empirical Results and Discussion  
We begin by addressing the problem of modeling differences among firms over time.  
Hausman tests for random versus fixed-effects specifications yield large values for all the 
models, leading us to reject the random-effects specification.  All model estimates presented 
below include unreported fixed-effects constants. The fixed-effects specification prevents us 
from including industry indicators among our explanatory variables.  We explore the possibility 
of industry effects as a robustness check in Section IV.C.  
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A. Supply of Trade Credit 
Table 6 reports estimates of equation (1) and robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity and within-cluster (-firm) correlation.18 Estimates of (1) produced by the 
whole sample (WS) and by the unconstrained (U) and constrained (C) subsamples appear in 
columns (1)-(3), respectively.   
 
**** Table 6 about here **** 
 
The whole sample model estimate strongly supports the existence of a trade credit channel 
(column 1). In loose-money periods firms supply trade credit commensurate with their credit 
market access, as shown by the positive and decreasing estimated  coefficients of D_CMA2n, n = 
1,2,3.  More specifically, firms with the best access (i.e., D_CMA21 =1) supply nearly 12% more 
trade credit than firms with the poorest access (i.e., D_CMA24 =1, the excluded category) and 
firms with the next-to-best and next-to-poorest access (i.e., D_CMA22 =1 and D_CMA23 =1, 
respectively) supply 9% more and 4.5% more, respectively.19  Tight policy leads firms to expand 
the supply of trade credit: the positive estimated coefficient of D_TMP-1 implies that firms 
                                           
18 Stock and Watson (2008) note that while the standard heteroskedasticity-robust estimator is inconsistent for the 
fixed effects estimator, the cluster-robust estimator is consistent. 
19 Table 5 Panel B shows a mean AR/A of 0.179 for the whole sample. In Table 6 column (1) the estimated 
coefficient of D_CMA21 is 0.021.  Hence compared with firms having the poorest credit market access, firms with 
the best credit market access supply ( 100 x 0.021/0.179 =) 11.7% more trade credit.   
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increase their accounts receivable by about 3.4% on average.20  In addition, tight policy leads 
firms to expand the supply of trade credit by amounts commensurate with their credit market 
access, as indicated by the positive and generally decreasing estimated coefficients of D_TMP-
1*D_CMA2n, n = 1,2,3. The estimated coefficients imply that, relative to firms with the poorest 
credit market access, firms with the best, next-to-best and next-to-poorest credit market access 
expand their accounts receivable by additional amounts averaging 2.8%, 2.8%, and 1.7%, 
respectively. 
The estimated coefficients of the remaining independent variables conform to expectations. 
Smaller and younger firms extend more trade credit per dollar of assets (LnA-1 and LnAge-1 have 
significant negative coefficients) consistent with a strategy of offering trade credit to compensate 
for unknown reputations.  Firms with greater growth opportunities offer more trade credit 
(Tobin’s Q-1 has a significant positive coefficient) consistent with promoting sales to alleviate 
cash constraints. Firms with greater prior-quarter sales supply more trade credit in the current 
quarter (Sales/A-1 has a significant positive coefficient) as expected when firms offer some trade 
credit to facilitate transactions and when sales show positive time trends. These firms cut back 
their supply of trade credit when monetary policy is tight, however (D_TMP-1*Sales/A-1 has a 
significant negative coefficient).  Firms with less prior-quarter cash supply more trade credit 
(CS/A-1 has a significant negative coefficient) consistent with depleting cash to purchase product 
inputs, produce product and support credit sales. Tighter policy has no measurable impact on this 
process (D_TMP-1*CS/A-1 has a statistically insignificant coefficient). Greater prior-quarter 
                                           
20 Table 5 Panel B shows a mean AR/A of 0.179 for the whole sample. In Table 6 column (1) the estimated 
coefficient of D_TMP is 0.006.  Hence in tight money periods, the sample firms expand their accounts receivable by 
about (100 x 0.006/0.179 =) 3.4%.   
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accounts payable support greater purchases of product inputs leading to greater current-quarter 
credit sales (AP/A-1 has a significant positive coefficient). 
Further support for a trade credit channel comes from the trade credit supply models 
estimated on the unconstrained and constrained panels (columns 2 and 3, respectively).  In loose-
money periods firms with the best credit market access supply the most trade credit and supply 
decreases with declining market access: in columns (2) and (3) the coefficients of D_CMA2n, n = 
1,2,3, are significant, positive and declining in n.  More precisely, relative to firms with the 
poorest credit market access firms with the best access (i.e., D_CMA21 =1) supply 14.6% 
(10.5%) more trade credit in the unconstrained (constrained) subsample.21  Analogously, firms 
with the next-to-best credit market access (i.e., D_CMA22=1) supply 10% (10.3%) more trade 
credit than firms with the poorest access in the unconstrained (constrained) subsample, while 
firms with the next-to-poorest credit market access (i.e., D_CMA23=1) supply 4% (5.5%) more 
trade credit in the unconstrained (constrained) subsample. In column (2) the estimated 
coefficients of the D_CMA2n terms do not consistently exceed the estimated coefficients in 
column (3), contrary to expectations.  Consistent with expectations, in tight-money periods 
unconstrained firms supply more trade credit but constrained firms do not: the estimated 
coefficient of D_TMP-1 is positive and significant in column (2) but statistically insignificant in 
column (3). The estimated coefficient of D_TMP-1 in column (2) implies that tight money leads 
                                           
21 Table 5 Panel B shows a mean AR/A of 0.151 for unconstrained firms in loose-money periods. In Table 6 column 
(2) the estimated coefficient of D_CMA21 is 0.022.  Hence compared with unconstrained firms having the poorest 
credit market access, unconstrained firms with the best credit market access supply (100 x 0.022/0.151 =) 14.6% 
more trade credit.   
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unconstrained firms to expand their accounts receivable by an average of 2.5%.22  Also 
consistent with expectations, tight-money periods lead unconstrained firms – but not constrained 
firms – to supply more trade credit in proportion to their credit market access: the estimated 
coefficients of D_TMP-1*D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3 are significant, positive and declining in n in 
column (2) but are statistically insignificant in column (3).  The estimated coefficients in column 
(2) imply that tight money leads unconstrained firms with the best, next-to-best and next-to-
poorest credit market access to add about 5.5%, 5.0% and 3.7%, respectively, to their usual 
supplies of trade credit.23   
The estimated coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are qualitatively similar to 
the estimates in column (1) with only slight differences. A one-percent increase in prior-quarter 
sales to assets leads to a 23.8% increase in accounts receivable to assets at constrained firms 
versus a 16.5% increase at unconstrained firms.24  The larger elasticity may mirror constrained 
firms’ greater need to use trade credit to facilitate transactions. This need does not abate in tight-
money times: the coefficient of D_TMP-1*Sales/A-1 is statistically zero for constrained firms 
instead of negative as for unconstrained firms.  Constrained firms also recycle less trade credit: a 
                                           
22In Table 5 Panel B the mean AR/A for unconstrained firms is 0.157. In Table 6 column (2) the coefficient of 
D_TMP is 0.004. Hence in tight money times, unconstrained firms expand accounts receivable by (100 x 
0.004/0.157 =) 2.5% on average. 
23 Table 5, Panel B shows a mean AR/A of 0.163 for unconstrained firms in tight money periods. In Table 6 column 
(2) the coefficient of D_TMP*D_CMA21 is 0.009. Thus when money becomes tight, the least constrained firms add 
(100 x 0.009/0.163=) 5.5% to their accounts receivable. 
24 Table 2 shows that constrained firms have a mean AR/A and mean Sales/A–1 of 0.20 and 0.34, respectively.  In 
Table 6 column (3) the coefficient of Sales/A–1  is 0.14. Thus the elasticity of accounts receivable to assets with 
respect to sales to assets is (100 x 0.14 x 0.34/ 0.20 =) 23.8% 
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one-percent increase in prior-quarter accounts payable to assets raises accounts receivable to 
assets by about 10% at constrained firms versus nearly 15% at unconstrained firms. 
 
B. Demand for Trade Credit 
Table 7 reports estimates of equation (2) produced by the whole sample and by the 
unconstrained and constrained panels. The estimates appear in columns (1)-(3) respectively. 25     
 
**** Table 7 about here **** 
 
The model estimate for the whole sample (column 1) shows weak evidence of a trade credit 
channel.  Consistent with a channel, in loose-money periods firms’ demand for trade credit is 
decreasing in credit market access, as shown by the negative and increasing estimated 
coefficients of D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3.  In particular, firms with the best credit market access (i.e., 
firms with D_CMA21 =1) demand about 27% less trade credit than firms with the poorest access 
(i.e., firms with D_CMA24 =1, the excluded category) while firms with the next-to-best and next-
to-poorest access (i.e., firms with D_CMA22 =1 and D_CMA23=1, respectively) demand 17.5% 
less and about 10% less, respectively.26  Inconsistent with a channel, tight monetary policy has 
                                           
25 In our models βnd, n=1,2,3, measures trade credit demand by firms in credit market access category n relative to 
category 4 in loose-money periods, φd measures the change in trade credit demand in tight-money periods common 
to all firms including firms in category 4, and  γnd, n=1,2,3, measures the change in trade credit demand in tight-
money periods by firms in category n relative to firms in category 4. 
26 Table 5 Panel B reports the mean AP/A for the whole sample as 0.103.  In Table 7 column (1) the coefficient 
D_CMA21 is -0.028.  Hence relative to firms having the poorest credit market access, firms with the best access 
demand (100 x -0.028/0.103 =) 27.2% less trade credit. 
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no measurable effect on the common demand for trade credit by the sample firms: the estimated 
coefficient of D_TMP-1 is positively signed but statistically indistinguishable from zero.  The 
interactive effect of tight monetary policy and credit market access is consistent with a trade 
credit channel but this effect is small.  Specifically, in tight-money periods the marginal demand 
for trade credit is decreasing in firms’ credit market access, as shown by the negative and 
increasing estimated coefficients of D_TMP-1*D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3, but only the marginal 
demand by firms with the best access differs statistically from the demand by firms with the 
poorest access; this difference is less than 3%.27 
Most of the other independent variables have estimated coefficients which conform to 
expectations. Larger firms demand less trade credit (the coefficient of LnA-1 is negative and 
significant), consistent with established reputations affording better credit market access and less 
reliance on trade credit. Firms with greater growth opportunities demand more trade credit (the 
coefficient of Tobin’s Q-1 is positive and significant) as they are typically cash constrained. 
Firms with greater prior-period sales have greater current-period demand for trade credit with 
which to buy production inputs (the coefficient of Sales/A-1 is positive and significant). Tight 
money has no measurable effect on this demand (the coefficient of D_TMP-1*Sales/A-1 is 
statistically insignificant).  As expected of firms which match the maturities of their assets and 
liabilities, firms with more prior-period short-term assets – cash, accounts receivable and 
inventories – demand more trade credit in the current period (the coefficients of CS/A-1, AR/A-1 
and INV/A-1 are positive and significant).  Tight money intensifies the relationship between 
                                           
27Table 5 Panel B reports the mean AP/A for the tight money periods as 0.106.  In Table 7 column (1) the coefficient 
D_TMP*D_CMA21 is -0.003.  Hence relative to firms having the poorest credit market access, firms with the best 
access reduce their demand for trade credit by (100 x -0.003/0.106 =) 2.8%. 
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prior-period cash and current-period trade credit demand (the coefficient of D_TMP-1*CS/A-1 is 
positive and significant). Firms with greater cash flow demand less trade credit especially in 
tight-money times (the coefficients of CF/A-1 and D_TMP-1*CF/A-1 are negative and significant) 
as internal funds cost less than trade credit. Similarly, firms with greater access to long-term debt 
markets demand less trade credit (the coefficient of LTD/A-1 is negative and significant). Only 
the coefficient of LnAge-1 defies expectations: older firms with reputations which should give 
them better credit market access demand more trade credit instead of less (the coefficient of 
LnAge-1 is positive and significant).   
Estimated trade credit demand models for the unconstrained and constrained firms (columns 
2 and 3, respectively) also show weak evidence of a trade credit channel. Consistent with a 
channel, the model estimates for both panels show that firms’ demand for trade credit is 
decreasing in credit market access during loose-money periods.  Also consistent with a channel, 
the estimated coefficients of the credit market access variables have smaller absolute values in 
the unconstrained panel. Specifically in the unconstrained panel, firms with the best credit 
market access, next-to-best access and next-to-poorest access demand 20% less, 11% less and 
6% less trade credit than firms with the poorest market access, respectively. 28 The analogous 
metrics in the constrained panel are 32%, 22% and 13%. Tight monetary policy has no 
measurable effect on the common demand for trade credit by firms in either the unconstrained or 
constrained panels: the estimated coefficients of D_TMP-1 are statistically insignificant instead 
of being positive and larger in column (3) as predicted.  The estimated coefficients of the tight 
                                           
28 Table 5 Panel B shows a mean AP/A of 0.097 for unconstrained firms. In Table 7 column (2) the estimated 
coefficient of D_CMA21 is -0.019.  Hence compared with unconstrained firms having the poorest credit market 
access unconstrained firms with the best access demand (100 x -0.019/0.097) 19.6% less trade credit.   
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money/credit market access interaction terms also contravene expectations.  In particular in the 
unconstrained panel, tight policy reduces by about 4% trade credit demand by firms with the best 
credit market access relative to firms with the poorest access while leaving demand by firms in 
the two other access categories unchanged. In the constrained panel all of the tight money / credit 
market access interaction terms have statistically insignificant coefficients instead of having 
coefficients larger in absolute value than in the unconstrained panel.  
The other explanatory variables in the unconstrained and constrained model estimates have 
coefficients similar to those for the whole sample estimate, with three exceptions.  First, the 
prior-quarter cash-to-assets ratio (CS/A-1) has coefficients with opposite algebraic signs: positive 
in the unconstrained model estimate as expected when firms match the maturities of their assets 
and liabilities but negative in the constrained model estimate. The latter coefficient, which 
implies that a one-percent cash ratio increase reduces trade credit demand by 1.5%, suggests that 
constrained firms treat cash and trade credit as substitute methods of purchasing production 
inputs, as might be expected when firms are cash constrained and trade credit is expensive. 29 
Tight-money periods weaken this substitutability, as might be expected when firms are 
especially cash-constrained: the positive coefficient of D_TMP-1*CS/A-1 in column (3) moves 
the elasticity of trade credit demand with respect to the cash ratio from -1.5% to -0.4%, near 
zero.30 Second, the prior-quarter long-term debt-to-asset ratio has coefficients with differing 
                                           
29 Table 2 shows that constrained firms have mean AP/A-1 and CS/A-1 of 0.11 and 0.15, respectively.  In Table 7 
column (3) the estimated coefficient of CS/A-1 is -0.011.  Hence a one-percent increase in CS/A-1 decreases AP/A-1 
by (100 x -0.011 x 0.15/0.11 = ) 1.5% .  For unconstrained firms the same increase in CS/A-1 raises AP/A-1 by 1.5%. 
30 In Table 7 column (3) the estimated coefficient of D_TMP* CS/A-1 is 0.008.  Hence in tight-money periods a one-
percent increase in CS/A-1 decreases AP/A-1 by  (100 x (-0.011 + 0.008) x 0.15/0.11=)0.4%. For unconstrained firms 
the same increase in CS/A-1 raises AP/A-1 by more than 2%.   
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statistical significance. Specifically the long-term debt ratio has a negatively signed coefficient in 
the unconstrained model estimate, consistent with our prior belief that firms with good credit 
market access demand less trade credit, but a statistically insignificant coefficient in the 
constrained model estimate, as might be expected at firms having little long-term debt due to 
poor credit market access. Finally the tight money / cash flow interaction term, D_TMP-1* 
CF/A-1, has statistically insignificant coefficients in both the unconstrained and constrained 
model estimates despite having a significant negative coefficient in the whole sample estimate.  
Thus tighter money has no measurable effect on the substitutability between cash flow and trade 
credit as methods of buying production inputs.  
 
C. Robustness Checks 
We check the robustness of our main results by modifying and re-estimating our trade credit 
supply and demand models.31  
 
**** Tables 8 and 9 about here **** 
 
Tables 8 and 9 report estimated trade credit supply and demand models which replace the 
binary tight-money indicator, D_TMP-1 , with the effective federal funds rate, FFR-1, a 
continuous variable.32  The supply model estimates in Table 8 are similar to the original 
estimates in Table 6, with two exceptions. First, in loose-money periods the supply of trade 
                                           
31  All of the estimated models described in this section but not reported are available upon request. 
32 Characterizing monetary policy with FFR presumes that an incremental change in the federal funds rate has a 
constant impact on trade credit supplied or demanded irrespective of its level.  In contrast, characterizing policy with 
D_TMP-1 presumes that the impact of policy depends only on whether the fed funds rate is below or above 5%.   
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credit from unconstrained firms is less sensitive to credit market access: in column (2) the 
coefficients of D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3 are positive and declining in n but notably smaller than in 
Table 6.  Further, these coefficients are smaller than the corresponding coefficients for 
constrained firms in column (3), contrary to expectations. Second, a monetary policy tightening 
expands the supply of trade credit by constrained firms: the coefficient of FFR-1 in column (3) is 
significant and positive, unlike the coefficient of D_TMP-1 in Table 6, column (3).  Further, the 
coefficient of FFR-1 is larger for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms (0.003 versus 
0.001), contrary to expectations. In Table 9 the demand models using FFR-1 as the tight-money 
indicator are very similar qualitatively to the original estimates in Table 7. 
 
**** Tables 10 and 11 about here **** 
 
Tables 10 and 11 report estimated trade credit supply and demand models which 
characterize credit market access with the continuous variable CMA2 (Z-score) in place of the 
credit market access quartile-indicators D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3,4.33 The supply model estimates in 
Table 10 strongly support the existence of a trade credit channel and are qualitatively similar to 
the original estimates in Table 6.34 Specifically, in loose-money periods trade credit supply is 
                                           
33 Representing credit market access with the continuous variable CMA2 presumes that an incremental change in 
credit market access has a constant impact on trade credit supplied or demanded. Representing credit market access 
using the quartile indicators D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3 allows an incremental change in credit market access to have 
different impacts. The estimated coefficients of CMA2 and D_CMA2n should have opposite algebraic signs due to 
our choice of CMA2 quartile 4 as the excluded category. 
34Using CMA2 in place of the quartile-indicators D_CMA2n, n=1,2,3, changes the conditions supporting a trade 
credit channel as follows: βs,γs<0; βd,γd>0;|βs|,|γs| larger for unconstrained firms; |βd|,|γd| larger for constrained firms. 
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increasing in credit market access particularly for unconstrained firms (CMA2-1 has negative 
coefficients); a policy tightening increases trade credit supply from all firms but particularly 
from unconstrained firms (D_TMP-1 has positive coefficients); and marginal trade credit supply 
in tight-money periods is increasing in credit market access particularly for unconstrained firms 
(D_TMP-1*CMA2-1 has negative coefficients).  In Table 11 the demand model estimates are 
qualitatively similar to the original model estimates in Table 7 and less supportive of a trade 
credit channel.  Specifically, like the original model estimates and consistent with a trade credit 
channel, trade credit demand is decreasing in credit market access in loose-money periods 
especially for constrained firms (CMA2-1 has positive estimated coefficients), as is marginal 
demand in tight-money periods (D_TMP-1*CMA2-1 has positive coefficients). Like the original 
model estimates but inconsistent with a trade credit channel, tight-money periods do not 
measurably increase the general demand for trade credit demand (D_TMP-1 has statistically 
insignificant coefficients) and marginal trade credit demand is larger from unconstrained firms 
(D_TMP-1*CMA2-1 has a larger estimated coefficient in column 2 than in column 3).     
In addition to the model estimates we report in Tables 6-11 which use a fixed-effects 
specification, we estimate analogous models which use a random-effects specification.  This 
latter specification allows the inclusion of industry indicators in the trade credit supply and 
demand models, a potentially important modification.  However, the estimated models with 
random-effects are qualitatively similar to the estimated models with fixed-effects. 
Equations (1) and (2) use quarterly indicator variables to control for seasonality effects 
however firms in different industries may face different seasonal sales patterns and may choose 
to smooth them out using trade credit (Bougheas et al., 2009).  We explore this possibility in two 
ways. First, we re-estimate fixed-effect models augmented by a set of interactions between 
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quarterly indicators and industry indicators. 35  Second, we re-estimate random-effects models 
which include quarterly indicators, industry indicators, and interactions between them. These re-
estimated models are all qualitatively similar to the estimates reported in Tables 6 and 7 except 
for exhibiting stronger evidence favorable to CMA1 and CMA2 as determinants of trade credit 
supply and demand. 
 
D. Discussion 
The estimated whole-sample trade credit supply and demand models, reported in column (1) 
of Tables 6 and 7 respectively, imply that a monetary policy tightening, represented by a change 
in D_TMP from 0 to 1, increases the net supply of trade credit from public firms, represented by 
AR/A-1 - AP/A-1, and directs it from firms with better credit market access towards firms with 
poorer access. Specifically, a tightening increases the common supply of trade credit (the point 
estimate of φs is .006) without measurably affecting the common demand for trade credit (the 
point estimate of φd is zero) thus expanding the common net supply of trade credit ( φs − φd = 
.006 > 0).  Additionally, a tightening both increases the supply of trade credit from firms having 
the best credit market access relative to firms having the poorest access (the point estimate of γ1s  
is .005) and decreases their demand (the point estimate of γ1d is -.003) thus expanding their net 
supply of trade credit (γ1s − γ1d = .008 > 0).  Analogously, a tightening expands the net supply of 
trade credit from firms having the next-to-best and next-to-poorest credit market access relative 
to firms having the poorest access (γ2s − γ2d = .005 > 0  and γ3s − γ3d = .003 > 0, respectively). 
                                           
35 Collinearity prevents the inclusion of industry dummies in a fixed-effects model, hence we control for industry 
effects by controlling unobservable individual effects at the firm level. Collinearity does not prevent inclusion of 
industry/quarterly interactions terms, however.  
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Thus our empirical evidence supports the existence of a trade credit channel as characterized by 
Meltzer (1960). 
Our findings differ somewhat from those of Choi and Kim (2005) who also investigate the 
existence of a trade credit channel.36  They use the 3-month Treasury bill rate, R, to represent the 
stance of monetary policy in trade credit supply and demand models estimated on quarterly 
Compustat data for S&P500 firms and for a similar number of other public firms.37 In trade 
credit demand equations estimated for the two panels they find that the coefficients of R are 
significant, positive and approximately equal, suggesting that tight policy increases about equally 
trade credit demand by S&P500 and non-S&P500 firms.   In trade credit supply equations they 
find that the coefficients of R are again significant and positive but over 50% larger in the model 
estimate for non-S&P500 firms.  Kim and Choi conclude that tighter monetary policy produces 
an expansion of trade credit – consistent with a trade credit channel – but with trade credit 
flowing mainly from non-S&P500 firms.  We believe two factors explain the difference between 
their findings and ours.  First, our credit market access variables CMA1 and CMA2 (WW-score 
                                           
36 Choi and Kim estimate separate supply and demand models of trade credit on quarterly Compustat data for 659 
S&P 500 firms and 689 non-S&P 500 firms from the end of 1975 to the end of 1997. Estimates of the models most 
similar to ours appear in the b columns of their Tables 1 and 2. As we do, they define the supply and demand for 
trade credit as AR/A-1 and AP/A-1, respectively. The explanatory variables in their supply models include Sales/A-1 
and LnA-1 (which also appear in our models), ΔSales+/A-1 and ΔSales–/A-1 (positive and negative changes in the 
sales-to-asset ratio), [ LnA-1]2, INV/A-1, the retained-earnings-to-assets ratio, and Ln(Short-term Debt/A-1).  The 
explanatory variables in their demand models include LnA-1 and INV/A-1 (which also appear in our models), the cost 
of goods sold to asset ratio, ΔCOG+/A-1 and ΔCOGS–/A-1, [ LnA-1]2, and the retained-earnings-to-assets ratio. 
37 Choi and Kim also use two other measures of policy stance in alternative specifications of their models: change in 
the federal funds rate and a binary indicator of quarters in which Federal Reserve policy became explicitly 
disinflationary. The results are qualitatively similar to the results using the 3-month Treasury bill rate. 
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and Z-score) identify more precisely firms which supply or demand trade credit than 
membership in a particular stock market index.  Second, we allow the impact of tight money to 
vary by firms’ market access through the use of tight money / credit market access interactions 
terms.38 
Although our evidence points to a traditional trade credit channel, our estimated models also 
show evidence of credit flows from constrained firms to unconstrained firms in loose-money 
periods.  In Table 6 the estimated coefficients of the CMA2 quartile indicators in column (3) 
imply that constrained firms in the next-to-poorest, next-to-best and best credit-market-access 
quartiles provide, respectively, about 5½%, 10¼% and 10½% more accounts receivable in loose 
money periods than firms with the poorest credit market access; the comparable metrics for the 
unconstrained panel (column 2) are 4%, 10% and 14½%, respectively.  The literature offers at 
least two explanations for extensions of trade credit by financially weak seller firms to 
financially strong buyer firms. First, weak sellers are often informational opaque, making them 
risky counterparties. Trade credit permits buyers to inspect goods from opaque sellers and return 
defective product without loss of cash (Smith, 1987; Long et al., 1993). Second, weak sellers 
may be coerced by strong buyers into extending trade credit on terms which lower effective 
product prices (Fabbri and Klapper, 2009; Murjin and Njoroge, 2015).  Klapper et al. (2012) find 
that buyers with market power receive lower effective prices from sellers lacking power who sell 
                                           
38 Like the estimated models Choi and Kim report, the estimated models we report in Tables 8 and 9 represent the 
stance of monetary policy with a market interest rate. In our estimated trade credit supply models (Table 8) the 
interest rate coefficient is larger in the constrained panel than in the unconstrained panel, similar to Choi and Kim: 
0.003 versus 0.001. The estimated coefficients of the tight money/credit market access interaction terms are 
significantly larger in the unconstrained panel, however, supporting our conclusion that trade credit flows from firms 
with good credit market access to firms with poorer access. 
32 
 
on credit with long repayment periods. Giannetti et al. (2011) find that buyers with market power 
receive lower prices through trade credit offered with large early payment discounts.  Our 
empirical findings are consistent with both explanations and add to a growing body of work 
showing trade credit flows from firms with poor credit market access to firms with good access.  
Our empirical findings present two puzzles. First, how can we reconcile the evidence in 
Table 7 that tight monetary policy has little measurable effect on trade credit demand defined as 
AP/A, with the evidence in Table 5 that mean AP/A is statistically larger in tight-money periods 
than in loose-money periods?  The most plausible explanation is that tight monetary policy raises 
mean AP/A through the financial determinants of trade credit demand, namely LnA-1, Tobin’s Q-
1, Sales/A-1, CS/A-1, AR/A-1, INV/A-1, CF/A-1, and LTD/A-1.  In the estimated whole sample 
trade credit demand model (Table 7, column 1), the determinants with the largest coefficients (in 
absolute value) are LnA-1 (inversely related to AP/A), and Sales/A-1, AR/A-1 and INV/A-1 
(directly related to AP/A).  The coefficient estimates imply elasticities of AP/A with respect to 
LnA-1, Sales/A-1, AR/A-1 and INV/A-1 of –57.5%, 35.3%, 23% and 20.3%, respectively. Hence a 
policy tightening might raise AP/A if log-assets fall sufficiently and/or one or more of Sales/A-1, 
AR/A-1, or INV/A-1 rises sufficiently. A policy tightening reduces corporate assets, raising AP/A.  
Nilsen (2002) estimates VAR models in which tighter monetary policy leads to an 8-quarter drop 
in GDP, reducing Sales and lowering AP/A-1, and an 8-quarter rise in inventories, raising AP/A. 
The estimated trade credit supply models in Table 6 show that a monetary policy tightening 
raises AR/A-1, raising AP/A. Thus tighter monetary could plausibly raise AP/A despite 
statistically insignificant estimated coefficients on the tight money indicators and the tight money 
/ credit market access interaction terms. 
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Second, how can tight monetary policy expand trade credit supply more than trade credit 
demand considering that a firm extending trade credit creates an account receivable on its own 
balance sheet and an account payable of equal size on the balance sheet of the borrowing firm?  
Since our sample covers essentially the universe of Compustat firms, the most plausible 
explanation is that the missing accounts payable appear on the balance sheets of private 
corporations.39  Evidence presented by Demiroglu et al. (2012) supports this view: their study of 
private and small public firms shows that tight monetary policy curtails bank lending primarily to 
private firms which lack established lines of credit and which, therefore, have few financing 
alternatives aside from trade credit. Evidence by Garcia-Appendini and Montorliol-Garriga 
(2013) indirectly supports this argument: their study of public supplier-client pairs around the 
2008 financial crisis shows that trade credit flowed from suppliers with the greatest liquidity to 
clients with the poorest credit market access, a result which should generalize to private clients. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper re-examines the case for a trade credit channel in the US which mitigates impacts 
from a monetary policy tightening as first described by Meltzer (1960).  Our empirical strategy 
differs from those in previous studies by employing quarterly firm-level data on essentially the 
universe of publicly-traded corporations over an extended time frame on which we estimate 
firm-level trade credit supply and demand models.  Our strategy also differs from previous 
studies in using the Whited and Wu (2006) index and the Altman (1968) Z-score index as 
modified by MacKie-Mason (1990) to represent firms’ degree of credit market access. These 
                                           
39 Choi and Kim (2005) suggest this possibility to explain their result that tight money expands trade credit supply 
more than trade credit demand however they cannot prove it since their data do not span the Compustat universe. 
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metrics permit finer distinctions between degrees of credit market access than possible from firm 
size or presence of a bond rating, metrics used in prior studies. Distinguishing accurately among 
degrees of credit market access is critical to uncovering evidence of a trade credit channel since 
its existence originates from financial market frictions which cause disparities in credit market 
access among firms. 
Our empirical results both confirm the existence of a trade credit channel as conceived by 
Meltzer (1960) and provide new evidence on its mechanics.  In particular, we find that a 
monetary policy tightening leads to an expansion in the supply of trade credit which is declining 
in public firms’ credit market access, a previously undocumented result.  A policy tightening also 
results in a nearly negligible expansion in the demand for trade credit by public firms, a finding 
which contrasts with Nilsen (2002) and Choi and Kim (2005) who report evidence of a trade 
credit channel from smaller firm samples. Together our findings imply that a trade credit channel 
works by funneling credit from public sector firms commensurate with their credit market access 
to private sector firms with few financing alternatives, a previously undocumented result.  
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Table 1  Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Variable Description 
 
CMA1  (WW-Score) 
 
Whited and Wu (2006) index.  Higher WW-score implies poorer credit market access. 
 
WW-score = –0.091(EBITDA/A–1) –0.062 PDIVD + 0.021 (LTD /A) – 0.044 LnA + 0.120 ISG – 0.035 SG      where 
 
 EBITDA/A–1 Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation / 
lagged assets 
PDIVD Positive cash dividends dummy 
 LTD / A Long-term debt / assets LnA Log of inflation-adjusted assets 
 ISG Percentage change in annual inflation-adjusted 
industry sales, by 3-digit SIC code 
SG Percentage change in annual inflation-adjusted sales 
 
CMA 2  (Z-score) 
 
 
Altman (1968) Z-score as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), multiplied by –1.  Higher Z-score implies poorer credit market access. 
 
Z-score  =  –3.3 (EBIT/A) – 1.0 (Sales/A) – 1.4 (ARE/A) – 1.2 (NWC/A)                where 
 
 EBIT / A Earnings after depreciation and before interest and 
taxes  / assets 
Sales / A Sales / assets 
 ARE/A (Accumulated) retained earnings / assets     NWC / A Net working capital / assets 
  
A Inflation-adjusted assets 
Age Firm age, measured as number of years of non-missing asset data in Compustat 
AP/A Accounts Payable / Assets 
AR/A Accounts Receivable / Assets 
CF/A Cash flow-to-assets ratio, measured as (Net Income + Depreciation) / Assets   
CS/A (Cash + Short Term Securities) / Assets 
FFR Effective federal funds rate  
INV/A Inventories / Assets 
Tobin's Q Market value of assets/book value of assets   
D_CMA2n 0-1 indicator variable coded 1 if a firm is in CMA2 quartile n. D_CMA21=1 (D_CMA24=1) indicates a firm in the quartile with the best 
(poorest) credit market access. 
  
D_TMP 0-1 indicator variable coded 1 if monetary policy is tight, defined as an end-of-quarter federal funds rate greater or equal to 5%. 
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Table 2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
    
This table presents numbers of observations (NOBS), means, medians and standard deviations (Std Dev) for the variables defined in Table 1.   The whole sample comprises the 
quarterly Compustat universe between 1988 and 2008 excluding financial firms (SIC Code 60-69), utility firms (SIC Code 49), non-classified firms (SIC Code 99), firms with 
negative or zero assets, and firms with sales less than $5 million. Unconstrained (constrained) firms are firms in the least (most) constrained quartile of the CMA1 distribution in the 
current quarter and have the best (poorest) credit market access.  CMA1 is the Whited and Wu (2006) index defined in Table 1. 
 
 Variable Whole Sample  Unconstrained Firms  Constrained Firms NOBS Mean Median Std Dev  NOBS Mean Median Std Dev  NOBS Mean Median Std Dev 
Assets† 378244 2690 310 12634  72527 5863 923 19383  72527 1127 145 7864 
Sales† 378244 624 80 2833  72527 1322 216 4181  72527 280 38 2460 
CMA1  (WW-score) 303633 -0.55 -0.56 0.34  70873 -0.83 -0.80 0.28  70832 -0.26 -0.28 0.31 
CMA2  (Z-score)     343193 -0.60 -0.81 1.28  65046 -0.71 -0.80 0.98  67485 -0.31 -0.68 1.64 
AR/A 366681 0.18 0.16 0.13  70201 0.16 0.14 0.12  71113 0.20 0.18 0.14 
AP/A 371196 0.10 0.08 0.09  71165 0.10 0.08 0.08  71833 0.11 0.08 0.09 
Age ‡ 378244 11.39 9.00 8.51  72527 13.33 11.00 9.36  72527 11.03 9.00 7.59 
ARE/A 355769 -0.05 0.11 0.80  67905 0.07 0.15 0.58  69657 -0.24 0.05 1.04 
CF/A 378198 0.01 0.02 0.05  72522 0.02 0.02 0.04  72523 0.01 0.02 0.06 
CS/A 374232 0.13 0.06 0.17  71712 0.11 0.04 0.16  72067 0.15 0.07 0.18 
EBIT/A 376356 0.02 0.02 0.04  72236 0.02 0.02 0.03  72191 0.01 0.01 0.04 
EBITDA/A 342522 0.03 0.03 0.04  71607 0.04 0.03 0.03  71432 0.03 0.03 0.04 
INV/A 310214 0.18 0.15 0.15  61645 0.16 0.12 0.14  56295 0.19 0.15 0.17 
ISG 368529 1.54 1.48 2.60  72527 0.29 0.54 2.62  72527 2.94 2.45 2.95 
LnA 378244 14.38 14.18 1.78  72527 15.38 15.27 1.82  72527 13.66 13.42 1.52 
LTD/A 373945 0.21 0.16 0.22  72301 0.23 0.20 0.21  72283 0.19 0.11 0.22 
NWC 365601 0.23 0.21 0.24  69591 0.19 0.16 0.21  70445 0.24 0.24 0.26 
PDIVD 367962 0.36 0.00 0.48  71909 0.51 1.00 0.50  72048 0.22 0.00 0.41 
Sales/A 378244 0.33 0.28 0.22  72527 0.30 0.26 0.21  72527 0.34 0.29 0.23 
SG 342168 1.97 1.29 7.34  72527 4.56 2.55 8.25  72527 -0.11 0.05 7.58 
Tobin's Q 332791 1.86 1.42 1.47  64591 1.92 1.46 1.52  67173 1.69 1.34 1.15 
†  millions of 2008 dollars         ‡ years 
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Table 3   Descriptive Statistics for Accounts Receivable and Accounts Payable to Assets, by CMA1 Deciles 
 
This table presents numbers of observations (NOBS), means, medians and standard deviations (Std Dev) for accounts receivable and accounts 
payable to assets by CMA1 decile. CMA1 is the index of Whited and Wu (2006) defined in Table 1. Firms in Decile 1 (10) are the least (most) 
financially constrained and have the best (poorest) credit market access.  The sample comprises the quarterly Compustat universe of industrial firms 
between 1988 and 2008 excluding financial firms (SIC Code 60-69), utility firms (SIC Code 49), non-classified firms (SIC Code 99), firms with 
negative or zero assets, and firms with sales less than $5 million. 
 
CMA1 
Decile 
Decile Mean 
CMA1 
 Accounts Receivable (AR/A)  Accounts Payable (AP/A)  
 NOBS Mean Median Std Dev  NOBS Mean Median Std Dev  
Best access  1 -1.15  29415 0.16 0.13 0.12  29907 0.10 0.07 0.08  
2 -0.84  29524 0.16 0.14 0.12  29877 0.10 0.08 0.08  
3 -0.73  29565 0.16 0.14 0.12  29903 0.10 0.08 0.08  
4 -0.66  29539 0.17 0.15 0.12  29963 0.10 0.08 0.08  
5 -0.59  29624 0.17 0.15 0.12  29988 0.10 0.08 0.08  
6 -0.53  29662 0.18 0.16 0.13  30008 0.10 0.08 0.09  
7 -0.45  29710 0.18 0.17 0.13  30061 0.10 0.08 0.09  
8 -0.37  29726 0.19 0.18 0.13  30069 0.11 0.08 0.09  
9 -0.25  29737 0.20 0.18 0.14  30079 0.11 0.08 0.09  
Poorest access 10 0.08  29740 0.20 0.17 0.14  30058 0.11 0.08 0.09  
All 
 
 296242 0.18 0.16 0.13  299913 0.10 0.08 0.09  
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Table 4  Mean Accounts Receivable to Assets, Accounts Payable to Assets, CMA1 and  CMA2, by Year 
 
This table presents sample mean values of accounts receivable to assets (AR/A), accounts payable to assets (AP/A), and 
measures of credit market access CMA1 (the index of Whited and Wu, 2006), and CMA2 (Z-score of Altman, 1968, as 
modified by MacKie-Mason, 1990, multiplied by -1). Higher values of CMA1 and CMA2 imply poorer credit market access. 
The whole sample (WS) comprises the quarterly Compustat universe of industrial firms between 1988 and 2008 excluding 
financial firms (SIC Code 60-69), utility firms (SIC Code 49), non-classified firms (SIC Code 99), firms with negative or 
zero assets, and firms with sales less than $5 million. The unconstrained (U) and constrained (C) subsamples comprise firms 
in the least (most) constrained quartiles of the CMA1 distribution in the current quarter and have the best (poorest) credit 
market access.   
 
 
 
 AR/A  AP/A  CMA1  CMA2 
Year  WS U C  WS U C  WS U C  WS U C 
1988  0.21 0.17 0.23  0.11 0.10 0.12  -0.51 -0.85 -0.17  -1.05 -1.00 -0.96 
1989  0.21 0.18 0.23  0.11 0.10 0.12  -0.60 -0.92 -0.28  -1.01 -0.96 -0.88 
1990  0.20 0.19 0.22  0.11 0.10 0.12  -0.63 -0.96 -0.29  -0.96 -1.00 -0.78 
1991  0.20 0.18 0.22  0.11 0.10 0.13  -0.70 -1.03 -0.36  -0.93 -0.95 -0.79 
1992  0.20 0.16 0.23  0.11 0.10 0.12  -0.59 -0.91 -0.26  -0.95 -0.89 -0.87 
1993  0.20 0.16 0.22  0.11 0.10 0.12  -0.57 -0.90 -0.22  -0.92 -0.95 -0.80 
1994  0.20 0.16 0.23  0.11 0.11 0.12  -0.47 -0.82 -0.11  -0.91 -0.90 -0.80 
1995  0.20 0.16 0.24  0.11 0.10 0.12  -0.47 -0.83 -0.09  -0.89 -0.91 -0.76 
1996  0.20 0.17 0.22  0.11 0.11 0.11  -0.50 -0.88 -0.09  -0.87 -0.94 -0.68 
1997  0.20 0.17 0.23  0.11 0.10 0.11  -0.47 -0.88 -0.04  -0.82 -0.91 -0.60 
1998  0.19 0.16 0.23  0.10 0.10 0.11  -0.50 -0.96 -0.04  -0.73 -0.77 -0.54 
1999  0.19 0.16 0.20  0.10 0.09 0.11  -0.51 -0.94 -0.07  -0.64 -0.73 -0.42 
2000  0.18 0.16 0.20  0.10 0.10 0.10  -0.48 -0.95 0.06  -0.55 -0.70 -0.34 
2001  0.16 0.16 0.17  0.10 0.10 0.10  -0.72 -1.20 -0.26  -0.33 -0.54 0.10 
2002  0.16 0.16 0.16  0.10 0.09 0.10  -0.67 -1.08 -0.27  -0.23 -0.49 0.23 
2003  0.16 0.16 0.16  0.10 0.10 0.10  -0.55 -0.88 -0.19  -0.26 -0.61 0.20 
2004  0.16 0.14 0.17  0.10 0.09 0.10  -0.46 -0.80 -0.10  -0.37 -0.63 -0.03 
2005  0.16 0.14 0.17  0.10 0.09 0.10  -0.53 -0.87 -0.15  -0.36 -0.63 0.05 
2006  0.16 0.14 0.18  0.10 0.09 0.10  -0.52 -0.87 -0.15  -0.38 -0.65 0.13 
2007  0.15 0.14 0.17  0.09 0.10 0.10  -0.55 -0.91 -0.19  -0.38 -0.71 0.19 
2008  0.15 0.14 0.16  0.09 0.10 0.09  -0.60 -1.02 -0.14  -0.32 -0.65 0.16 
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Table 5  Descriptive Statistics for CMA1, Accounts Receivable to Assets and Accounts Payable to Assets, by 
Monetary Policy Stance 
 
This table presents statistics on CMA1 (the index of Whited and Wu, 2006), accounts receivable to assets (AR/A) and 
accounts payable to assets (AP/A) by monetary policy stance. Stance is measured by the end-of-quarter federal funds rate: 
stance is tight (loose) in quarters when the fed funds rate is at least (is less than) 5%. The whole sample comprises the 
quarterly Compustat universe of industrial firms between 1988 and 2008 excluding financial firms (SIC Code 60-69), utility 
firms (SIC Code 49), non-classified firms (SIC Code 99), firms with negative or zero assets, and firms with sales less than $5 
million.  Panel A shows descriptive statistics for CMA1 by policy stance. Higher CMA1 values imply poorer credit market 
access. Panel B shows mean AR/A and AP/A for the whole sample (WS) and for the unconstrained (U) and constrained (C) 
subsamples. Unconstrained (constrained) firms fall into the least (most) constrained quartiles of the CMA1 distribution in the 
current quarter and have the best (poorest) credit market access.    
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for CMA1 by Monetary Policy Stance for the Whole Sample 
Statistic: NOBS Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Monetary Policy Stance: 
      Loose  153525 -0.57 -0.57 0.33 -3.26 2.91 
Tight  150108 -0.53* -0.54 0.34 -2.69 3.09 
All 303633 -0.55 -0.56 0.34 -3.26 3.09 
 
 
Panel B:  Mean AR/A and AP/A for the Whole Sample and  Subsamples, by Monetary Policy Stance 
   AR/A  AP/A 
Sample: WS U C  WS U C 
Monetary Policy Stance: 
   
 
   Loose  0.171 0.151 0.185†  0.100 0.095 0.106† 
Tight   0.190‡ 0.163‡ 0.215†‡  0.106‡ 0.099‡ 0.111†‡ 
All  0.179 0.157 0.200†  0.103 0.097 0.109† 
 
* The statistic for tight policy is significantly greater than the statistic for loose policy. 
† The statistic for constrained firms is significantly greater than the statistic for unconstrained firms in the same policy stance. 
‡ The statistic for the tight policy stance is significantly greater than the statistic for the loose policy stance for firms in the 
same subsample. 
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Table 6  Estimated Supply of Trade Credit Models  
 
This table presents estimates of equation 1.  The dependent variable is accounts receivable to assets, AR/A. D_CMA2n is a 0-1 
variable coded 1 if a firm is in CMA2 quartile n; D_CMA24, the quartile with the poorest credit market access, is the excluded 
category. CMA2 is the Altman (1968) measure of financial distress as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), multiplied by –1. 
D_TMP is a 0-1 variable coded 1 in a tight-money period (the end-of-quarter fed funds rate is at least 5%). LnA is the natural log 
of assets, LnAge is the natural log of firm age, Tobin’s Q is the market to book ratio for assets, Sales/A is sales to assets, CS/A is 
cash and short-term securities to assets, and AP/A is accounts payable to assets. WS denotes the whole sample and U (C) denotes 
the unconstrained (constrained) subsample with the best (poorest) credit market access. The whole sample comprises the quarterly 
Compustat universe of industrial firms between 1988 and 2008. Firms in U (C) fall into the first (last) quartile of the CMA1 
distribution. CMA1 is the Whited and Wu (2006) index. Coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) appear in the first (second) 
rows for each independent variable.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. 
Each estimated model includes unreported quarterly dummies and firm fixed-effects constants. All variables are winsorized at 1% 
from their lower and upper bounds.    
Sample: WS U C (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables  (predicted coefficients):    D_CMA21,𝑡−1  (β1s > β2s > β3s > 0)† 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) D_CMA22,𝑡−1 (β1s > β2s > β3s > 0)† 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) D_CMA23,𝑡−1  (β1s > β2s > β3s > 0)† 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 (φs > 0)‡ 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA21,𝑡−1  (γ1s > γ2s > γ3s> 0)§ 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA22,𝑡−1 (γ1s > γ2s > γ3s> 0)§ 0.005*** 0.008*** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA23,𝑡−1  (γ1s > γ2s > γ3s> 0)§ 0.003*** 0.006*** -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     LnAt−1 (δ1s < 0) -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) LnAget−1 (δ2s < 0) -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.008*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) Tobin′s Qt−1 (δ3s > 0) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) Sales/A𝑡−1 (δ4s > 0) 0.122*** 0.088*** 0.140*** 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) CS/A𝑡−1 (δ5s < 0) -0.129*** -0.107*** -0.144*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) AP/A𝑡−1 (δ6s > 0) 0.207*** 0.234*** 0.179*** 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ Sales/A𝑡−1 (δ7s = ? ) -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ CS/A𝑡−1 (δ8s = ? ) -0.001 0.004 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Number of Observations 288,430 58,408 62,717 
Number of Firms 10,966 7,231 7,789 
Adj. R-squared 0.23 0.22 0.22 
† βn
s  greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms.   ‡ φs greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms. 
§ γns  greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms. 
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Table 7   Estimated Demand for Trade Credit  Models 
 
This table presents estimates of equation 2.  The dependent variable is accounts payable to assets, AP/A.  D_CMA2n is a 0-1 variable 
coded 1 if a firm is in CMA2 quartile n; D_CMA24, the quartile with the poorest credit market access, is the excluded category. 
CMA2 is the Altman (1968) measure of financial distress as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), multiplied by –1.  D_TMP is a 0-1 
variable coded 1 in a tight-money period (the end-of-quarter fed funds rate is at least 5%). LnA is the natural log of assets, LnAge is 
the natural log of firm age, Tobin’s Q is the market to book ratio for assets, Sales/A is sales to assets, CS/A is cash and short-term 
securities to assets, AR/A is accounts receivable to assets, INV/A is inventory to assets, CF/A is cash flow to assets, and LTD/A is 
long-term debt to assets. WS denotes the whole sample and U (C) denotes the unconstrained (constrained) subsample with the best 
(poorest) credit market access. The whole sample comprises the quarterly Compustat universe of industrial firms between 1988 and 
2008. Firms in U (C) fall into the first (last) quartile of the CMA1 distribution. CMA1 is the Whited and Wu (2006) index. 
Coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) appear in the first (second) rows for each independent variable.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. Each estimated model includes unreported quarterly dummies 
and firm fixed-effects constants. All variables are winsorized at 1% from their lower and upper bounds.    
Sample: WS U C (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables  (predicted coefficients):    D_CMA21,𝑡−1  (β1d < β2d < β3d < 0) † -0.028*** -0.019*** -0.035*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) D_CMA22,𝑡−1 (β1d < β2d < β3d < 0) † -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.024*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) D_CMA23,𝑡−1  (β1d < β2d < β3d < 0) † -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.014*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 (φd > 0) ‡ 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA21,𝑡−1        (γ1d < γ2d < γ3d < 0) § -0.003** -0.004** -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA22,𝑡−1 (γ1d < γ2d < γ3d < 0) § -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA23,𝑡−1  (γ1d < γ2d < γ3d < 0) § 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     LnAt−1 (δ1d < 0) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) LnAget−1 (δ2d < 0) 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Tobin′s Qt−1 (δ3d > 0) 0.001*** 0.001** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sales/At−1 (δ4d > 0) 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) CS/At−1 (δ5d > 0) 0.007** 0.014*** -0.011* 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) AR/At−1 (δ6d > 0) 0.128*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) INV/At−1 (δ7d > 0) 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.121*** 
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) CF/At−1 (δ8d < 0) -0.085*** -0.082*** -0.072*** 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) LTD/At−1 (δ9d < 0) -0.005** -0.007* 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
     D_TMPt−1 ∗ Sales/At−1 (δ10d = ? ) -0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) D_TMPt−1 ∗ CS/At−1 (δ11d = ? ) 0.007*** 0.006* 0.008* 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) D_TMPt−1 ∗ CF/At−1 (δ12d = ? ) -0.016** -0.018 -0.008 
  (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) 
     
Number of Observations 238,850 50,416 49,202 
Number of Firms 9,074 5,996 6,369 
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 
† |βnd | greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms.   ‡ φd greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms. 
§ |γnd| greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms. 
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Table 8  Robustness Check: Estimated Supply of Trade Credit Models with the Federal Funds Rate 
 
This table presents estimates of equation 1.  The dependent variable is accounts receivable to assets, AR/A. D_CMA2n is a 0-1 variable 
coded 1 if a firm is in CMA2 quartile n; D_CMA24, the quartile with the poorest credit market access, is the excluded category. CMA2 
is the Altman (1968) measure of financial distress as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), multiplied by –1.  FFR is the federal funds 
rate. LnA is the natural log of assets, LnAge is the natural log of firm age, Tobin’s Q is the market to book ratio for assets, Sales/A is 
sales to assets, CS/A is cash and short-term securities to assets, and AP/A is accounts payable to assets. WS denotes the whole sample 
and U (C) denotes the unconstrained (constrained) subsample with the best (poorest) credit market access. The whole sample 
comprises the quarterly Compustat universe of industrial firms between 1988 and 2008.  Firms in U (C) fall into the first (last) quartile 
of the CMA1 distribution. CMA1 is the Whited and Wu (2006) index. Coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) appear in the first 
(second) rows for each independent variable.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, 
respectively. Each estimated model includes unreported quarterly dummies and firm fixed-effects constants. All variables are 
winsorized at 1% from their lower and upper bounds.    
 
Sample: WS U C (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables  (predicted coefficients):    D_CMA21,𝑡−1  (β1s > β2s > β3s > 0)† 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.019*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) D_CMA22,𝑡−1 (β1s > β2s > β3s > 0)† 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.019*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) D_CMA23,𝑡−1  (β1s > β2s > β3s > 0)† 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) 
     FFR𝑡−1 (φs > 0)‡ 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
     FFR𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA21,𝑡−1  (γ1s > γ2s > γ3s> 0)§ 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) FFR𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA22,𝑡−1 (γ1s > γ2s > γ3s> 0)§ 0.002*** 0.005* -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) FFR𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA23,𝑡−1  (γ1s > γ2s > γ3s> 0)§ 0.001** -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
     LnAt−1 (δ1s < 0) -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) LnAget−1 (δ2s < 0) -0.004*** -0.003* -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) Tobin′s Qt−1 (δ3s > 0) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) Sales/A𝑡−1 (δ4s > 0) 0.141*** 0.107*** 0.152*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) CS/A𝑡−1 (δ5s < 0) -0.124*** -0.108*** -0.137*** 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) AP/A𝑡−1 (δ6s > 0) 0.204*** 0.233*** 0.179*** 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) 
     FFR𝑡−1 ∗ Sales/A𝑡−1 (δ7s = ? ) -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) FFR𝑡−1 ∗ CS/A𝑡−1 (δ8s = ? ) -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Number of Observations 264,827 58,411 62,733 
Number of Firms 10,547 7,231 7,789 
Adj. R-squared 0.23 0.22 0.22 
† βn
s  greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms.   ‡ φs greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms. 
§ γns  greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms. 
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Table 9   Robustness Check: Estimated Demand for Trade Credit Models with the Federal Funds Rate 
 
This table presents estimates of equation 2.  The dependent variable is accounts payable to assets, AP/A. D_CMA2n is a 0-1 variable coded 1 
if a firm is in CMA2 quartile n; D_CMA24, the quartile with the poorest credit market access, is the excluded category. CMA2 is the Altman 
(1968) measure of financial distress as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), multiplied by –1. FFR is the federal funds rate.  LnA is the 
natural log of assets, LnAge is the natural log of firm age, Tobin’s Q is the market to book ratio for assets, Sales/A is sales to assets, CS/A is 
cash and short-term securities to assets, AR/A is accounts receivable to assets, INV/A is inventory to assets, CF/A is cash flow to assets, and 
LTD/A is long-term debt to assets. WS denotes the whole sample and U (C) denotes the unconstrained (constrained) subsample with the best 
(poorest) credit market access. The whole sample comprises the quarterly Compustat universe of industrial firms between 1988 and 2008.  
Firms in U (C) fall into the first (last) quartile of the CMA1 distribution. CMA1 is the Whited and Wu (2006) index. Coefficient estimates 
(robust standard errors) appear in the first (second) rows for each independent variable.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. Each estimated model includes unreported quarterly dummies and firm fixed-effects constants. All 
variables are winsorized at 1% from their lower and upper bounds.    
Sample: WS U C (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables  (predicted coefficients):    D_CMA21,𝑡−1  (β1d < β2d < β3d < 0) † -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.033*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) D_CMA22,𝑡−1 (β1d < β2d < β3d < 0) † -0.016*** -0.007*** -0.022*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) D_CMA23,𝑡−1  (β1d < β2d < β3d < 0) † -0.010*** -0.005** -0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
     FFR𝑡−1 (φd > 0) ‡ 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
     FFR𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA21,𝑡−1        (γ1d < γ2d < γ3d < 0) § -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) FFR𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA22,𝑡−1 (γ1d < γ2d < γ3d < 0) § -0.001* -0.001** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) FFR𝑡−1 ∗ D_CMA23,𝑡−1  (γ1d < γ2d < γ3d < 0) § -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
     LnAt−1 (δ1d < 0) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) LnAget−1 (δ2d < 0) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Tobin′s Qt−1 (δ3d > 0) 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sales/At−1 (δ4d > 0) 0.109*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) CS/At−1 (δ5d > 0) -0.002 0.010 -0.022*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) AR/At−1 (δ6d > 0) 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.125*** 
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) INV/At−1 (δ7d > 0) 0.113*** 0.110*** 0.121*** 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) CF/At−1 (δ8d < 0) -0.086*** -0.078*** -0.087*** 
  (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) LTD/At−1 (δ9d < 0) -0.005** -0.007* 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
     D_TMPt−1 ∗ Sales/At−1 (δ10d = ? ) 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) D_TMPt−1 ∗ CS/At−1 (δ11d = ? ) 0.002*** 0.001 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) D_TMPt−1 ∗ CF/At−1 (δ12d = ? ) -0.001 -0.002 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Number of Observations 218,046 50,419 49,214 
Number of Firms 8,698 5,996 6,369 
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 
† |βnd | greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms.   ‡ φd greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms. 
§ |γnd| greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms. 
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Table 10  Robustness Check: Estimated Supply of Trade Credit Models with CMA2 as a Continuous Variable 
 
This table presents estimates of equation 1.  The dependent variable is accounts receivable to assets, AR/A. CMA2 is the Z-score 
of Altman (1968) as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), multiplied by -1; higher values imply poorer credit market access.  
D_TMP is a 0-1 variable coded 1 in a tight-money period (the end-of-quarter fed funds rate is at least 5%). LnA is the natural log 
of assets, LnAge is the natural log of firm age, Tobin’s Q is the market to book ratio for assets, Sales/A is sales to assets, CS/A is 
cash and short-term securities to assets, and AP/A is accounts payable to assets. WS denotes the whole sample and U (C) denotes 
the unconstrained (constrained) subsample with the best (poorest) credit market access. The whole sample comprises the quarterly 
Compustat universe of industrial firms between 1988 and 2008.  Firms in U (C) fall into the first (last) quartile of the CMA1 
distribution. CMA1 is the Whited and Wu (2006) index. Coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) appear in the first (second) 
rows for each independent variable.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. 
Each estimated model includes unreported quarterly dummies and firm fixed-effects constants. All variables are winsorized at 1% 
from their lower and upper bounds.    
 
Sample: WS U C (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables  (predicted coefficients):    CMA2 𝑡−1  (βs < 0)† -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 (φs > 0)‡ 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ CMA2𝑡−1  (γs < 0)§ -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     LnAt−1 (δ1s < 0) -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) LnAget−1 (δ2s < 0) -0.003*** -0.002 -0.005** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) Tobin′s Qt−1 (δ3s > 0) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) Sales/A𝑡−1 (δ4s > 0) 0.130*** 0.094*** 0.144*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) CS/A𝑡−1 (δ5s < 0) -0.124*** -0.102*** -0.142*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) AP/A𝑡−1 (δ6s > 0) 0.206*** 0.237*** 0.180*** 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ Sales/A𝑡−1 (δ7s = ? ) -0.013*** -0.020*** 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ CS/A𝑡−1 (δ8s = ? ) -0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Number of Observations 288,430 58,408 62,717 
Number of Firms 10,966 7,231 7,789 
Adj. R-squared 0.23 0.22 0.22 
† |βns | greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms.   ‡ φs greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms. 
§ |γns | greater for unconstrained firms than constrained firms. 
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Table 11   Robustness Check: Estimated Demand for Trade Credit Models with CMA2 as a Continuous Variable 
 
This table presents estimates of equation 2.  The dependent variable is accounts payable to assets, AP/A. CMA2 is the Z-score of 
Altman (1968) as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), multiplied by -1; higher values imply poorer credit market access.   
D_TMP is a 0-1 variable coded 1 in a tight-money period (the end-of-quarter fed funds rate is at least 5%). LnA is the natural log 
of assets, LnAge is the natural log of firm age, Tobin’s Q is the market to book ratio for assets, Sales/A is sales to assets, CS/A is 
cash and short-term securities to assets, AR/A is accounts receivable to assets, INV/A is inventory to assets, CF/A is cash flow to 
assets, and LTD/A is long-term debt to assets. WS denotes the whole sample and U (C) denotes the unconstrained (constrained) 
subsample with the best (poorest) credit market access. The whole sample comprises the quarterly Compustat universe of 
industrial firms between 1988 and 2008.  Firms in U (C) fall into the first (last) quartile of the CMA1 distribution. CMA1 is the 
Whited and Wu (2006) index. Coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) appear in the first (second) rows for each 
independent variable.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. Each estimated 
model includes unreported quarterly dummies and firm fixed-effects constants. All variables are winsorized at 1% from their 
lower and upper bounds.    
Sample: WS U C (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables  (predicted coefficients):    CMA2 𝑡−1  (βd > 0) † 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 (φd > 0) ‡ 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
     D_TMP𝑡−1 ∗ CMA2𝑡−1        (γd  > 0) § 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     LnAt−1 (δ1d < 0) -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) LnAget−1 (δ2d < 0) 0.007*** 0.003** 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Tobin′s Qt−1 (δ3d > 0) 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Sales/At−1 (δ4d > 0) 0.110*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) CS/At−1 (δ5d > 0) 0.005* 0.013** -0.014** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) AR/At−1 (δ6d > 0) 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 
  (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) INV/At−1 (δ7d > 0) 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.120*** 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) CF/At−1 (δ8d < 0) -0.085*** -0.074*** -0.066*** 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) LTD/At−1 (δ9d < 0) -0.005** -0.008** 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
     D_TMPt−1 ∗ Sales/At−1 (δ10d = ? ) -0.001 0.002 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) D_TMPt−1 ∗ CS/At−1 (δ11d = ? ) 0.006*** 0.006* 0.007* 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) D_TMPt−1 ∗ CF/At−1 (δ12d = ? ) -0.016* -0.017 -0.007 
  (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) 
     
Number of Observations 218,046 50,419 49,214 
Number of Firms 8,698 5,996 6,369 
Adj. R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 
† |βnd | greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms.   ‡ φd greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms. 
§ |γnd| greater for constrained firms than unconstrained firms. 
 
 
 
 
